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When I am in love, there is palpitating,
 
passionate, unique meaning, but only-
 right here and now, a meaning that
 might be absurd in another conjunction.
—Julia Kristeva, Histoires d'amour
Therefore, one who speaks in 
a
 tongue  
should pray to be able to interpret. For if
 I pray in 
a
 tongue, my spirit is at prayer  
but my mind is unproductive. So what is
 to be done?




In The Ravishing of Lol Stein, Marguerite Duras
 
writes what might be called the primal scene of tie
 formation. We are at a seaside town, in a casino. It’s
 night. The public place is brightly lit, full of people
 enjoying themselves. They are dancing. Food and
 drinks are laid out; huge plants form improvised
 screens beyond which people are chatting and mov
­ing. The moment comes when Anne-Marie Stretter
 appears at the door. Michael Richardson looks 
as
 she  
makes her way through the crowd and stands by oth
­ers. From then on he seeks her. He crosses the crowd
 in her direction; more than once he misses her just
 before their
 
trajectories match, swept astray by people  
moving and dancing. Not long after he reaches her
 and invites her to dance. They dance without mak-
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ing a sound for each other. At the end of the dance, Anne-Marie Stretter leads
 
the way and Michael Richardson, who had been with Lol, follows without
 turning back. Lol has been watching from the start; when the scene slows
 down too much for her eyes, she faints.
Lol’s amnesia draws out
 
for us the essentially schizoid link of social and pri ­
vate. Lol's loss of consciousness remarks flatly
 
— in what other way could one  
comment? — on the incommensurability of the two. Shifted to the position of
 the third as Anne-Marie Stretter comes in and Michael Richardson follows her
 back with unremitting concentration, Lol’s person is taken over by a revolu
­tionary change. She must understand Being as being in a place, a temporary
 place from which the sudden other removes us.1 She must know Being as
 awaiting to be moved to a third position, that of the witness. Through the uni
­vocal encounter of Anne-Marie Stretter and Michael Richardson, Lol 
is
 now  
made to watch what Being had so recently meant to her. She must bear wit
­ness to a brutal, full meaning that asserts itself without history, precedents, or
 knowledge (the two are complete strangers until they walk away so obviously as
 lovers). Lol’s amnesia inaugurates a dissociative link: as I say
 
I, the other rises;  
as I say I, my identity withdraws, shifted at the request of the other that I can
­not — what else could I do? — resist. “What 
is
 at stake here, is the incision of  
an outside in an inside, a withdrawal of identity in the advent of identity”
 (Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy 200). Lol’s fainting proves how “inaudible,
 untenable” (203) 
is
 this “strange election of dissociation: the choice of a nonob-  
jectifiable object [Lol’s splitting from Michael Richardson who chooses
 Anne-Marie Stretter] which, incorporating itself, divides me,” leaving me rav
­ished every time after this (207). In the casino scene of The Ravishing of Lol
 Stein, Duras records a woman’s birth into the philosophy of the Other. As she
 does so, she throws into relief a problem attendant to this birth.
In the third position the witness cedes to the other, and to the primacy of
 
the other — Anne-Marie Stretter’s velvet sheet was irresistible! — which she
 cannot change. The third position is ethical subjectivity, the alternative subjec
­tivity of the dissociative link. Thereafter driven to the witness position in the
 triangulated space in which she has been newly born, Lol will experience her
­self in the non-event of being-as-the-object-of-choice, of private love. Duras,
 or Lol, raises an impossible question, a doubt without answer: must private
 
love  
die for the Other, that is to say, for the sake of the social tie?
* * *
A woman and a man early in the evening. What kind of leap, and across what
 
kind of abyss, 
is
 needed to bring this man and this woman near? Even simply  
in space, materially close. When I think that this is impossible — it was at
 hand and so impossible for our main and our woman in the evening — I think
 about love.
On their way to the theater, he said: “You are already forming schools.”
 
The man had uttered the call; the woman understood. From there she, too,
 could watch Anne-Marie Stretter and her lover coming together. On the
 threshold of the theater she stepped forth. Uninventively, she said, “You could
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start your own school," submitting to that something between terror and bore
­
dom she had not asked to repeat this time. His voice rose at her back, from a
 larger distance now, “Yes....” Having for sure seen which direction the
 
woman  
would walk down the theater steps, the man went down the opposite way. He
 did not follow; he did not sit near. From that place one could watch and tell




Why can’t the institution speak of love? Would (an attempt to theorize) love
 
fold theory away? Would the institution have to learn of its own retreat? See
 itself as a grave from beyond which it speaks? And yet, to speak theoretically
 is, for me, my dearest, to speak lovingly, for when one speaks the truth one 
falls in love.
—Ewa Badowska, “Amuck”
To be welcomed into a School of Theory automatically means to attempt to
 
write about theory. And writing about theory after a School of Theory invites
 you in means entering a contract: to give to the institution the practice that
 exceeds its own institutionalization. If it is hard to make sense of the notion of
 theory, it is because this notion perhaps appears as theory writes, in unpre
­dictable turns. It would be easy to absolutize the institution and take writing
 outside a school — writing would be a pretext for the romance of madness, of
 the drift toward madness with which any institution tantalizes its outsiders.
 Being given theory by a school turns out to be 
a
 more complex affair.
In his essay on schizophrenia, “The Effort to Drive the Other Person
 Crazy,” Harold Searles recounts the story of a patient
 
who was a brilliant inter ­
preter: “She appeared to find some hidden meaning in almost every
 
word and  
even in almost every syllable, looking at me significantly, with 
a
 sarcastic smile,  
very frequently, as though convinced I was aware of the secret meanings which
 she found in all this” (274-5). The woman’s exegetical passion is so boundless,
 it puts beside the point interpretive boundaries and decorum. Where others
 stop at suspecting them, the woman draws the meanings out in the open of
 words. Searles may be “aware of the secret meanings” but it is the woman who
 “appeared to find” them. “What she was doing with me,” Searles concludes,
 “compares very closely with her mother’s taking her to movies, during her
 childhood, and repeatedly commanding her, ‘Now, think!’ which the patient
 took — correctly, I believe — as the mother’s command for the daughter to per
­ceive the same secret, special meanings in the course of the movie which the
 mother, an actively psychotic person throughout the girl’s upbringing, found in
 it” (275).
Searles’s anecdote gives an idea of the fantasy of symmetry to which the
 
members of the institution feel invited: to know how to read, as Searles’s
 patient demonstrates, at times means to answer a call — “Now, think!” — to
 match some secret, special meanings already found. Institutions may be con-
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strued by their own members as a bit like the schizophrenogenic mother who
 
has found the meanings and asks the daughter to think them. Or they may
 resemble 
a
 liberal father whose permission still governs even the most  
Dionysian, anarchic carnivalesque. The Digital Dnderground’s song
 
"
doowutchyalike " ends: “Daddy, can I go outside? / Gowhereyalike, kid.”  
Daddy still grants permission. In both cases —. the meaning-granting schizo
­phrenogenic mother and the anarchic father — what stands out is the institu
­tion’s self-questioning, evident in the gifts it exchanges with its acolytes:
 unlimited semiosis in the first case, disinhibition in the second. Thus,
 
what the  
institution gives the moment one comes into contact with it is an anxiety about
 its own training power: how can I not exclude what I cannot train?2
It would seem a contradiction in terms to think of an institution of theory
 
since theory initially emerged as a place from which to question traditional
 institutional practices of reading (and writing). To be given theory from its
 institution has a strange effect: one does not know whether to read the movie
 or do what one likes. While indecision lasts, one writes. But as one writes, the
 heady combination of schizophrenogenic power and the father’s yes that has
 come with the institution of theory assails one with a doubt: why does writing
 about theory seem to remain, even after a School, an improvisation? Why, even
 after the entitlement of an institution, does writing about theory seem to drift
 toward a minor plot? Why does it seem as if it were the tongue of a mind
 unproductive?
In Searles’s anecdote the woman’s exegetic passion is especially evocative of
 
a view of meaning commonly associated with theory — multiplicity and poly
­semy. And ambiguity, the offspring of proliferation of meaning that throws the
 very process — if not sense — of interpretation off.3 This vocation for dis
­banding meaning, this tendency to assail the reader “with feelings of confusion
 and unreality,” 
is
 proof that theory has a pressing story to tell.
Theory rose in the academy when the university began to throw its doors
 open to all sorts of historical subjectivities previously barred from its halls.
 Theory has functioned as both the pretext for this opening and a surveilling
 device of the entrance of the new subjects. Perhaps, it is owing to this dual
 work that theory, although synonymous with the self-critique of privilege and
 the consequent disbanding of the unified literary
 
canon, and despite its fortune,  
has not yet managed to dispel the suspicion of 
a
 phylogenetic  bond of word and  
blood. According to this suspicion, linguistic access (linguistic subjectivity)
 flows from socially inflected symbolic access.
If it has become popular because it wants to do away with any hereditary
 
right to language, theory is still sensitive to the classic charm of a familial,
 mimetic bond between language and society. Indeed, even structuralism, which
 for many, especially through its marriage to linguistics, anthropology, and
 Marxism, marked an initiation to theory as it came later to be known, might
 
be  
said to have been victim to such seductive closure. As Emile Benveniste has
 established, subjectivity is an effect of language: I am when I say I. But how
 do we know that, even when taken as a purely formal universe, language still
 does not mimic, in incurable servility, history with all its institutions — class,
 materiality (which means material disparities), and, not least, affects: envy,
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hatred, as well as love, etc. — whose origins get lost in the accidents of misfor
­
tune? If the signifying chain of differences is at once the chain of language and
 the circle of society, as an effect of language, subjectivity remains firmly plant
­ed in the terrain of justice — in the question of who can rise and who cant in
 the social circle. If we do not want to think of language in an exclusive way, as
 a faculty
 
that comes (or does not come) to us through family (therefore, nation,  
academy, class) blood, then it is necessary to separate the symbolic from the
 familial transmission of language. (The linguistic and symbolic existences of
 the subject may not be one and the same.) In order to do this, language, which
 in its public dimension is voice, must be installed neither through the father nor
 the mother; it must be given by another. Similarly it can also be taken away,
 scandalously, unjustly, when the other abandons us.
The abandonment leaves the subject to an unsymbolized impoverishment
 
that wanders through thought without aim; the withdrawal of the linguistic
 pass from another abandons the subject to an unjust and unhealed disparity.
 Correcting structuralism, "theory” says that the subject is neither born at birth
 nor in the mother tongue, but through a pass coming from another. Theory
 may be understood as the dialectical image of a contemporary tale difficult to
 bear: the tale about another giving you language or cutting you off from it,
 telling
 
you that  you can pass into it or taking the pass away. This and only this  
pass satisfactorily legitimizes the subject’s citizenship in the country of the
 Concept.
For so long language and class have been locked in the reciprocal panic of
 
a Hegelian dialectic: one, somehow, needed to kill the other in order to rise.
 Class has never meant linguistic entitlement or conceptual power; on the con
­trary, it has wandered through thought quietly withdrawn in the melancholic
 incorporation of the lost object of language, mourning a lost linguistic fluency.
 But in the tension between narrative and conceptuality, theory can disband the
 bond of blood and language; it can turn against a discriminatory
 
Law  that enti ­
tles, including or excluding, and thus permit the bond between class and lan
­guage to come to the fore. Theory is language’s belated mourning of 
"
class,” the  
name for an unjust and unhealed disparity — a discontent — at the heart of the
 social tie.
June 17
Sputiamo su Hegel (The ordinary)
Man has searched for the meaning of life beyond and against life itself. For a
 
woman, life and the meaning of life never cease to overlap.
—Carla Lonzi, Sputiamo su Hegel
The woman is at the School of Theory. She is expecting her birth. She wan
­
ders in the morning along
 
the outskirts of the  beautiful campus, where the front  
gardens are in bloom with the giant poppies she had not seen before, with
 peonies and irises; where the silent houses and the sloping lawns are supposed
 to consign to her something of the spirit of the place. "You are new,” some
5
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voice out of the landscape will say in a moment. But no wrinkle, no dehiscence;
 
only the muteness of an adherence, taking root inside, pulling outward — like
 destiny.
Back in her room, she gives in. “I realize,” the hand writes. This 
is
 what  
stoops down to kiss her eerily at
 
The School of Theory: not Kant, not Hegel,  
not Foucault. Like Kafka’s man before the law she is missing the last good
 chance to enter with support. “I realize,” the hand pulls on
 
without mercy, “the  
human tie.” The stark truth she could know really anywhere else, not here, not
 now but anywhere far and outside of the beautiful campus, had found
 
her again.  
The woman now regresses back and back to a place she confusedly calls her
 “origins.” Her mind tumbles down — zero degree of thought. Now, once
 again, she will fall flat in that region where any School would leave, where no
 one 
is
 and language does not improve. No matter  what it did before, the mind  
tumbles down in the swamp, reduced to feeling what the woman calls the banal
 pain of dialectics. The hand writes: “the possibility of someone else coming
 close brings immediately the pain of exclusion — one excludes as one comes
 close.” And she has no system against it. She had dreamed of acquiring the
 words of a truth beyond all reasons: a shared logos, like a vineyard with fruits
 for all, “whose only worth lies in being exposed ... as when a face lights up,
 opening” (Jean-Luc Nancy xxxviii). The Face-Logos. But how to think the
 shareable logos, which is neither project nor appropriation, without setting
 everyone on the axis of the ethical, always ceding to another, living for another
 and in another? Finally oblivious to self-consciousness through this ceding, all
 trembling on the same bough? “Are you a Concept human tie?” the woman
 screams.
Now the woman 
is
 unlocking the door of the building. She hears someone’s  
quick
 
footsteps. As she is opening the door, she turns and sees a young woman  
behind her. As the woman is opening the door, the young woman sweeps by
 into the building. She has a purpose and is holding onto it avidly, trying to be
 on her best behavior with others.
The woman goes up to her room and knows that time has changed her,
 
changed her mind. Thought no longer comes in surging motions. One wave
 after another after another. Now it comes in fits. She does not know
 
whether  
there is any desire attached to it now. It is more like a necessity: time and
 thought had come to coincide.
After the episode of the young woman, she looks at herself in the mirror.
 
She sees the change in her face. She sees her past. She sees her young lover
 turn and go. She is wearing her gifts 
as
 she turns — a leather jacket, the ruby  
stones. From the back she looks burdened, yet expectant. She is the younger.
 Was that when the intellect and the body had collapsed into each other never
 to split again? The woman and the lover had come together originally to
 assuage the violence of history, one in the name of the ethical, the other in the
 name of private love. For one of them the body had to step aside. Believing
 she was fighting the violence of history, all the while she had prolonged it by
 choosing a body that from birth had had to step aside. She had only been
 telling a family story. Fearing for her mind, wanting a mind, she had chosen a
 woman. But in doing so, she had only prolonged a family story.
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On her way to the theater she looked down at the gorge. “I realize,” the
 
hand writes. She was falling — back and back. She heard the monotonous
 noise of the water, and the two o’clock chimes. She remembered Quentin in
 The Sound and the Fury, shaving. She thought of the smell of death in the midst
 of life and of laughing at the days to come.
June 25
Language could carry
At one point language could carry. At the table of the café, the five people
 
jumped into verbal confrontation. It’s not that language carries immediately,
 even the most dexterous; we can carry our points more or less skillfully when
 we hear a comprehensible idiom. It follows that one can speak only after train
­ing, and less from accord. Does training at this café table disguise as accord?
It might feel like a problem of boundaries: how do I step into this circle?
 
Will I? Can I? The questions, which essentially reduce speech to a case of
 mustering power among others, however, appear as a misguided
 
plea  for the ful ­
fillment of a want one cannot decently thrust on strangers too soon. Will I?
 Can I? The personal labor required to attain a proposition and, thus, the ter
­ror of differential speech, are not discredited by the want behind them — a
 want for the event of thinking.
At this table, our voices taking turns, we allow one another to hear truths
 
we had already come to, though scattered in different places, perhaps mixed to
 what Gramsci
 
would take as signs of non-thought  —  "brilliant paradoxes, witty  
word games, verbal acrobatics” (25) — because, after all, the voice needs to find
 
its 
point d'appui, and so spectacularly, before it can step in and warm up for the  
dialogue. But the coldness with which the others in the circle meet our inter
­nal agitation, almost thrusting the voice back below the throat, should not be
 taken at its face value. The novelty of our group is that the voice meets the
 obligation to rise and move outward not for our ears, in a way, not to put on
 this table the individual truths we have labored at so devotedly, oftentimes in
 such bleak isolation, but to carry on the obligation to hear the other "asking you
 to find the words with which he’ll make you hear him” (Nancy and Smock
 311). Just for tonight, the Face-Logos with no project. We are in the vineyard,
 on the same bough.
June 27-28
Really
At the threshold of the theater, since their planets were revolving around each
 
other, they took themselves in opposite directions, in haste, without looking.
 He did not follow, their eyeballs fixed solely on the lights on the wooden stage
 and the podium, on the rows of red seats. She thought he was another who
 wanted her to watch Anne-Marie Stretter again, so she took her place among
 the others. She would clear the path and go into the soul. Even as she
7
Mitrano: Theoretical Effects
Published by eGrove, 2020
8 Journal x
watched, her mind would be made strong by the speaker’s propositions. She
 
would know his ambition to make transparent the process of thinking as a
 squandering of his gift outward to many, many, and his self-destructive . . .
 social passion when thinking is on the verge of wanting to draw in things that
 cannot really be talked about, because how
 
could we carry them in speech with ­
out also wailing about coffee, about having a coffee or a coke alone or with
 someone, about a pang, a betrayal, a carnal fear, a falling for . .. tenderness, for
 the language of tenderness?
The man was drinking coffee in the square, sitting on the steps. He was
 
writing. The woman saw that he was watching
 
women. She went to where he  
was. He said "No,” and walked back with her over the bridge.
At 
11
 at night, he knocks on the door. He watches. Then he says, "So, can  
I kiss you?” The woman thinks, "let me give you a story.” "Do you want me to
 watch Anne-Marie Stretter?” it is saying. “Go to the many others and I’ll go
 to the soul,” it is saying. At the end of cruelty they kiss and kiss. It is as if the
 man let the woman kiss him.
June 29
Meditation on need
In Group Psychology, searching for an explanation of contagion, of "the mental
 
change which is experienced by an individual in a group” (88) and that makes
 him/her consent to things that, when alone he/she would not do, Freud comes
 up with the word "libido.” Much later, in Foucault this word would become
 "power” and by this name will expose itself as both the reason and limit of
 groups. But, originally, for Freud libido is the energy of love, cosmically under
­stood, and therefore not yet, as in Foucault, the mechanism of a public State
 that has perfectly infiltrated private souls. Freud writes:
Libido 
is
 an expression taken from the theory of the emotions. We call by  
that name the energy, regarded as a quantitative magnitude (though not at
 present actually measurable), of those instincts which have to do with all
 that may be comprised under the word "love.” The nucleus of what we
 mean by love naturally consists (and this 
is
 what is commonly called love,  
and what the poets sing of) in sexual love with sexual union as its aim. But
 we do not separate from this — what in any case has a share in the name
 "love” — on the one hand, self-love, and on the other, love for parents and
 children, friendship and love for humanity in general, and also devotion to
 concrete objects and to abstract ideas.
(90; emphasis added)
Extricated from the context of the couple, sexual love confuses itself with
 
humanitarian love; the sexual union prolongs the social love for family, friends,
 and humanity in general. Having lost its boundaries, "love” dissolves into the
 muddle of love. Freud’s indistinction between the social and the private spheres
 is here less reminiscent of a Foucauldian ideological continuum of individual
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and State apparatus and more of feminism. In this passage psychoanalysis and
 
feminism, especially that form of historical feminism that in the 1970s and
 early 1980s was called woman-identified feminism, seem to meet on common
 ground, arising both from a similar passion to experience in the choice of
 another social justice in action. (The feminist partners find their equal in the
 couple analyst/analysand). To a certain extent, feminism reproposed Freud
'
s 
muddle of love. Thriving on the juxtaposition of social and private love,
 woman-to-woman love (the politicized version of the lesbian relationship) per
­mits to assimilate to the sphere of intimacy the logic of reparation for the
 unfairness daily met by all the needs of others, an unfairness that the social is
 unable to repair.
Feminist love of the same celebrated synchronicity between the partners:
 
"Sleeping, turning in turn like planets / rotating in their midnight meadow”
 (Rich 82). The private couple, in turn,
 
became a fit metaphor for a better social  
tie admitting the possibility of equality. From this perspective, the feminist
 couple represents a position similar to what John Rawls calls "the veil of igno
­rance.” The essential premise of social
 
justice, the veil of ignorance, demands  
that we cede to the other’s right as if it were our right. We start as same and
 we see the need of
 
others. Out of restriction and in recognition of this need,  
one yields to the other’s part-taking. The problem with this position is that it
 conflates social justice and private love. From Freud to feminism to Rawls, it
 seems that a healed, just social tie would depend on this confusion.
* * *
Now that you are, the needs of others have become my numbness from you.
 
When you turn against me you save me from the crudeness of this split; you
 give me back to the social. Clad in a veil of ignorance, mindful of others’ fair
­ness to part-take of you, I have to give you.
Perhaps I was your social from the start. Did you kiss in me all the others’
 
need for justice? Did you repair with your kiss? Did you want to opt for the
 manageable and stop at night with the language of tenderness at least one of
 the million simultaneous cries, "Unfair to me”?
"There 
is
 no doubt,” Martin Stanton writes, "that Freud sternly admon ­
ished Ferenczi for what he termed 'the kissing technique’ (Kusstechnik), that is,
 the purported permission for patients to express physical affection to their ana
­lyst — as long, of course, as it did not drift into 
f
ull-scale sexual intercourse”  
(2). Freud thunders with disapproval of his pupil, who was taking the teacher’s
 psychoanalysis in an anarchic direction: "I see that the differences between us
 come to a head in a technical detail which is well worth discussing. You have
 not made a secret of the fact that you kiss your patients and let them kiss you;
 I had also heard that from a patient of my own” (quoted in Jones 174-5).
 Enraged, the master lashes out at the pupil, explaining the "new” kissing tech
­nique less with Ferenczi’s healing zeal and more with his self-serving desire to
 dethrone Freud himself in the eyes of future psychoanalytic adepts: "A number
 of independent thinkers in matters of technique will say to themselves: why
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which after all doesn
'
t make a  baby. And then bolder ones will come along who  
will go further to peeping and showing — and soon we shall have accepted in
 the technique of analysis the whole repertoire of demiviergerie and
 
petting-par ­
ties . . . and God the Father Ferenczi gazing at the lively scene he has created
 will perhaps say to himself: maybe after all I should have halted in my tech
­nique . . . before the kiss.”
Yet, despite Freud’s rage, Ferenczi may be viewed 
as
 Freud’s true disciple.  
He was acting out the muddle of love that the teacher himself— only an agent
 of history, as we all are registered in his thinking. "Psychoanalytic 'cure’ is
 in direct proportion to the cherishing love given by the psychoanalyst to the
 patient” (Ferenczi quoted in Stanton 139). To assuage the unfairness of their
 pain, to nurture and maybe heal his patients, it was said that Ferenczi, the prac





 fire: being sought, being written to — a kind of panic — coming  
into debt, indebted — "please forgive us our trespasses as we forgive those who
 trespass against us” — debtor coming back to make you debtor with exhausted
 eyes.
July 9
Antigone (At the Thai restaurant)
As if you were my brother —
 
before you, this coarse uniform, as if you were my  
brother — no candle at our table because you are my brother. When you are
 my brother I outspeak the tyrant — gloriously — outside of the polis, anony
­mous, unfeminine in my coarse tunic, yet unique in my rebellion. Because you
 are my brother, the Law does not exist, this fragile thing invented
 
by the whims  
of hysterical men. Everybody can see that. Then why do so few speak? If
 women had brothers, they would speak more often. When you are my brother
 I am on my quest to find the law; there 
is
 no reason for its fixity, I have noth ­
ing to lose in knocking down tyrants, my uniform makes me strong. The tie
 snaps. I share nothing with the
 
polis. My comrades and I laugh at  the awe with  
which you hold yourselves subjected to the Symbolic. There is nothing sure
 about it; you invent your own chains and call them male eyes that see you in,
 inside your societies, giving you rights — be insiders inside. Power does not
 come through them. Unchain yourselves. If you were my brother I would not
 be endangered near the tyrant. Strong in my anonymous uniform, I would not
 be prevailed upon by such an anonymous force to dream of having my hair
 untied and perfume oil between my fingers since you’d be my brother.
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Now we are in the ringed wood with the wall round it. This is Elvedon. I have
 
seen signposts at the cross roads with one arm pointing "To Elvedon.” No one
 has been here. The ferns smell very strong, and there are red funguses grow
­ing beneath them. Now we wake the sleeping daws who have never seen a
 human form; now we tread on rotten oak apples, red with age and slippery.
 There is a ring of wall round this wood; nobody comes here. . .. That is Elve
­don. The lady sits between the two long windows, writing.
—Virginia Woolf, The Waves
Every reader of Virginia Woolf’s The Waves has fantasized about the mysteri
­
ous woman in Elvedon. Every reader has probably wanted to carry on with
 Bernard’s story about her. The woman sat writing in the empty house, tied to
 her desk, charmed in Elvedon. The spruce tree boughs fluttered through the
 window
 
pane, over the grey slates of the roof of the white garage. Through the  
night the windows were kept lit, and the woman wrote at her desk in Elvedon.
 Every reader of The Waves has wished Bernard had finally shown a text by this
 woman in Elvedon. What was she writing all the time?
If we read again, however, another, perhaps more pressing, question forms
 
in the mind: How might it feel to be in an enchanted place that has 
"
never seen  
a human form,” where “[n]o one has been,” and where the ripples of this unique
 absence have irradiated from the center outward, to the things in the landscape
 deep in sleep, to the oak apples “red with age.” The woman is in a heroic place,
 romantic to the outsider’s eye. Her unity with her writing 
is
 indeed unvan ­
quished: she 
is
 always the woman writing, the one designated by her exclusive  
activity. Thus she has passed into subjectivity to the eyes of those who stare at
 the scene: less a woman and more a writer, herself now a figure of speech in the
 race of her writing. This 
is
 why Bernard cannot show us any text of  hers; so  
wide has the distance had to be between the palpitations inflecting the woman’s
 orthography and the expectations raised by the scene of her tenacity, by the
 unchanging intensity with which she gives her existence between the two long
 windows lit through the night. One, like Bernard, wouldn’t look for anything
 less than an interminable text of the future. Yet, considering the place of the
 woman, it 
is
 sensible to imagine her in a moment of weakness. On her desk her  
notebook worn with use, she succumbs to a roughness of expression, lets the
 hand go after the ink, annotating. Those who have discovered Elvedon would
 not think of reading in the text they are awaiting from her perhaps a curse
 against the interminable human distance that — unaware to them — she con
­tinues to occupy.
July 15
Just for an hour
The woman crossed the lawn, reached the mansion, and lingered in the dining
 
room. As calm descended on her, she walked out into the garden, slowly. It
11
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was late afternoon in the summer. People were humming to each other in cou
­
ples and in groups, and her dress was billowing 
as
 if in a novel. She saw a cir ­
cle with an empty spot. She took her place there. She saw the friendly faces
 who took her in the circle. The air became very still. People were chatting
 around her, yet their talk was held still at a remove from her; she could not dis
­tinguish a syllable. She was at the far end of the pier looking on the stilled
 mainland.
After a while the man got up as she was trying to. He went to get her a
 
glass of wine; he got them both a glass of white wine. He came back and sat
 by her side. People’s eyes in the circle were on them; the woman and the man
 were being together. She did not know
 
what she was saying. She was talking  
about Foucault and how American he was, and going for the philosophical
 experience of the subject without ground, then about Foucault in the summer,
 lying in the scorching sun of the long strip of beach in Civitavecchia, discover
­ing Nietzsche for the first time. They saw an ant carrying her food in the grass.
 The man looked at the ant carrying the food approvingly, then he looked at the
 woman and asked her to go swimming. The woman was scared of crowds.
Everything stood extremely still. People held their plates. The man and
 
the woman finished the wine. He said to go. The woman stood up; a bell jar
 had fallen on the entire party; noises were numb. The moment had come; peo
­ple receded in the background. But before she took the first step her soul stum
­bled; she saw the scene again. Her lover had cut her tongue before all times,
 for all times. Her voice said, “I am positioned; you are positioning me now in
 the place left empty not long ago, and only for a while, by chance. I am arbi
­trarily in place of... ” “Your choice,” she said to the man, “moving of objects
 
as
 if, as if,” she stumbled. “Even in our most private motions  when we soar with  
Plato’s charioteer it is the violence of history that chooses, when we flutter,
 twitching and abandoned, under its blows and mistake that trembling for love.”
 She wanted to go mad and caress the horses and the animals in all cities. Her
 rage would have destroyed the world. Through the long window of the man
­sion’s dining room, S.’s eyes caught hers for the classic fraction of a second. He
 waited to see what she would do. Following the man, the woman stopped to
 throw her paper plate in the trash can. The man stopped to wait. Although
 someone else followed them, everyone knew the woman and the man were
 walking out together.
The man dived; the water kept them apart, a wide space in between. The
 
woman thought, “Will our minds meet? Are they meeting?” Keeping at bay
 the loss of a plot just when one could be begun, she enjoyed letting him be a
 stranger with the privilege of scrutiny — pondering decisions, weighing, bal
­ancing accounts in his mind while the watery space in between kept them still
 untied. She dreamed of questions which he bore as a beacon. He had reached
 the rocky ledge beside the falls, on the other shore of the gorge. He sat in the
 evening sun; she saw his shape in focus but removed at the other end. Perhaps
 their gazes met, but who knows for sure from afar, with the pool of water in
 between. She waved; he waved back, lit by sunset. She went down with her
 mouth into the water. “He 
is
 my brother,” she said to the water. She was in  
Virgil. She held to the rock on her side of the gorge.
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The stillness she had brought over from the party cracked; she woke up to
 
the presence of people around the circle of the gorge — the children, the moth
­ers and the fathers, men, women — they stirred, played, made noises. She
 thought of coming from overseas, from beyond her ultramarine sea and being
 in the book of paradise if only for an hour. She cut herself lose, untied from
 narrative. She thought, “I am positioned and he 
is
 not positioning me: I am  
the fullness of sunset on my brother to send him forth.” Only her eyes above
 the
 
water, her body in this water tinged with earth and tree reflections as if now  
it were in her ultramarine sea from beyond — no difference. On the surface of
 the well of the gorge — “just for an hour” he had said “to cool down” — con
­tingency, brotherhood, nature.
July 16
Ontology and the Symbolic
For politics does not happen when you act on behalf of your own damaged
 
good, but when you act, without guarantees, for the good of all-this is to take
 the risk of the universal interest. Politics in this sense requires representation,
 the critique of representation, and the critique of the critique of representation.
—Gillian Rose, Mourning Becomes the Law
The Symbolic 
is
 the circle of the gorge. If the woman were to follow the man  
she would be lost to ontology. If she swam to him, the love-object would be
 made to consent to being the object of choice. Then, from him an infinite gain
 would come, resembling the touch of universality. In the convergence of the
 erotic and the intellectual, desire for the Concept consents to the ontologizing
 confusion of individual self-interest and the interest of the other. One’s gain
is made to become the other’s.
Martin Heidegger met Hannah Arendt and gained Being and Time from
 
her. In turn, she received intellectual empowerment. In his presence she
 received the indelible birthmark of the kin of philosophy and of philosophers.
 Love was installed, a love that meant
 




 different, so young, so sexual, so Jewishmerry and melancholy  
at the same time — this woman, half his age and so knowledgeable ... he
 wasn’t used to that, was entranced, 
as
 was she. What female student, 18  
and willing to listen, open to the spirit and tone of the lecture room and
 male character and male tongues, would want to resist? Nor did she want
 to resist, she wanted to love what she heard, and did so.
(Theweleit 28)
Entranced by the unresisting consent of another that needs our need, our sense
 
of locality and of limits dissipates. For Heidegger, Arendt was “the inspiration
 for his work in those years, the impetus to his passionate thinking” (Theweleit
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modernity, and not despite the body, but precisely because his ontic body was
 
sustained by an unresisting love-object, Heidegger could theorize the world.
 The Heidegger/Arendt relationship is exemplary because in this case theoriz
­ing the world, that is, the authority of the Concept, presumes the male body’s
 kinship with a giving maternal breast. Heidegger gave to the young, to an
 Arendt “willing” and “open ... to male character and male tongues” what the
 young will not be easily weaned from — the milk of thought . . . la filosofia.
 From her erotic tie to Heidegger she gained a universal tongue, a tongue that
 one speaks as easily as one can draw milk from a generous breast. At the con
­junction of the erotic and the intellectual, Arendt thus received the pass to phi
­losophy. The erotic alone could not give her the pass; it could come to her if
 Heidegger functioned simultaneously as male love-object and yielding breast,
 nourishing the young with the milk of thought.5 Thus her pass came to Arendt
 from a “mother” beyond the Father, both beyond the father figure that the older
 Heidegger was to his young pupil, and beyond the Freudian sense of the male
 child’s identification with the father as a necessary event in the child’s develop
­ment, which ultimately
 




have nothing to do with gender. In fact, the presumed  
necessity to think through the gender binary (sexed thought) might be a nega
­tion of that primary attestation of her kinship to philosophy that a woman
 intellectual gains from the convergence of the erotic and the intellectual situa
­tions. Though entitling, this convergence begs a question: if for women intel
­lectuals identification with the father means gaining the milk of thought and
 becoming fluent in the Concept, can one think without a Master?
If from her identification with the Father — which is more complex than
 
it appears because it also sends us to a maternal source — Arendt gained intel
­lectual entitlement, Heidegger, in his turn, did not learn anything from
 Arendt’s difference — as a Jew, as young, as woman, as listener. What was at
 stake was Heidegger’s milk-philosophia, its absolute essentiality as it made the
 listener willing, yielding from the very youth, giving up the possession of her
 difference (the Symbolic) in exchange for that which the thing she heard would
 bring. She was in a love-debt: “open to the spirit and tone of male character
 and male tongues, who would want to resist?” (Theweleit 28).
Through his willing Jewish pupil, Heidegger had renewed proof
 
that this  
milk could feed the aggressor and the betrayed equally. And as he gave and
 betrayed, Heidegger became hypnotized into the fundamental disengagement
 of
 
thought and the State. This disengagement is another name for ontology.  
Like politics, ontology “take[s] the risk of the universal interest” (G. Rose 62):
 in the name of, on behalf of, for,
 
with, on  the side. Like politics, ontology takes  
the risk that if I speak for you, you will submit, breast-feeding as it betrays oth
­ers but lending them the milk. “It requires representation,” a primary castra
­tion: no withdrawal is possible from the potlatch of love-debt. Gender must
 be left out for the milk-philosophia to run from the breast of the modern world
 (Theweleit 59).
Exchanged for the pass to universality that comes with the milk, gender, an
 
initial and long-lasting sacrifice, must ultimately remain before thought, an
14
Journal X, Vol. 5 [2020], No. 1, Art. 2
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jx/vol5/iss1/2
Mena Mitrano 15
abyss in which thought risks to fall. The problem is who can and would want
 
to resist this pass? If the pass is so difficult to resist, gender will never inter
­rupt the intimate, seductive, and exclusive whispering flowing directly from
 thought to State. (With 
a
 “Heidegger-lord” [Theweleit 59] catatonic to the  
good or evil of the universal interest that his children loved to hear when they
 loved his milk, we have the Nazi Heidegger.)
July 16
 
Euryalus and Nisus, the poem of force
The
 
woman and the man returned to the gorge, in full daylight. The bustle was  
carrying on: the young men, the children at play, and the women. The man
 watched. There were two people between them, but the stillness from the pre
­vious day had caught up with them. The man and the womans gazes never
 met. They were called, would be called even before death, elsewhere, each
 responding to that magnetic instance just passing by the presence of the other.
 They destroyed each other’s presence. The woman thought she and the man
 were making love in the stillness, across from the presence of the two people
 between.
The man came out from the water for the second time to lie in the after
­
noon sun. His hair was dripping; his eyes elsewhere, after the magnet. They
 were in Virgil, where a difference so discouraging to the Concept must be
 forced through the brotherly
 
tie. The  woman lived, wrote, had time — and the  
letter, and what
 
was the point of the letter? “Your body is so fragile, my Love!”
[...]
July 17-18
“So, can I kiss you?”
[A]ny society — is essentially political, since it is wholly dependent on the fig
­
ure of the Chief.... But we must go on to 
say
 that society, any society, is fun ­
damentally totalitarian — not, I hasten to add, because state coercion or tyran
­nical violence are somehow essential to this conception; these traits are in no
 way exclusive to totalitarian societies, and Freud clearly said that the reign of
 the Führer rests above all on the fiction of his love. Rather, if society for Freud
 is totalitarian in the strictest sense, it 
is
 because it presents itself as an inte ­
grally political totality, a totale Staat, knowing no divisions except the one —
 minimal, and solely intended to relate the social body to itself— between the
 beloved Chief and his loving subjects.
—Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen, The Emotional 




 private human relation, with this glitch that nevertheless requires reckon ­
ing in our rightful search for an alternative sociality? You turn. As both moth-
15
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er tongue and language slip, you turn away;
 
you turn your back and this is good.  
As you turn, you interrupt the totality. I can then hesitate: should I swim into
 you, should I not. If I know you will turn just as my mind slips toward you, if
 I know you will follow someone else’s back, I will also know in you a crack in
 the totality. I will be “beyond,” more toward the ethical, less stuck in the polit
­ical. “In the name of what do we need to imagine an alternative sociality?”6 My
 rope is cut loose; I float; I regress to the integral totality —
 
your loving subject,  
my beloved chief. There is nothing ethical about private love; only religion
 could restrain its extremist political vocation, or you — when you turn away.
 The greatest welling up of absence of private love gives rise to fascism. Now




No man is 
an 
Hand, intire of itselfe; every man a peece of the Continent, a part  
of the maine; if a Clod bee washed away by the Sea, Europe is the lesse, as well
 as if a Promontorie were, as well as if a Mannor
 
of thy friends, or of thine owne  






Parataxis is a figure of accretion, it heaps words on, using them more than
 
choosing them. It departs from calculation for lack of time, and from exegesis
 for the same reason, because the writer 
is
 in a hurry, “so inspired by his theme,  
it fills him so completely, and the desire to communicate himself and to be
 understood is so overwhelming” (Auerbach 166).
If lyric dreams of an “absolute inseparation” (Derrida 229) of body and let
­
ter, parataxis lives this desire in the light of day — acting out one’s being, mak
­ing a scene, graphic and therefore comprehensible to all, striking at “the crucial
 spot” in the heart, dissolving its memorized lines into haziness — “it arouses
 emotion, it staggers” (Auerbach 168).
An affront to the sovereignty of language, paratactic expression — “hurried,
 
awkward, uncalculated” (166), constantly driving itself into public display —
 lives on language’s raw material. The hurried writer loses one figure of speech
 after the other to the urgency of the acting-out of being — “to communicate
 himself.”
Parataxis gains conviction when details can no longer mislead, when, no
 
longer a question of symbolic investiture, language becomes rudiment, occasion
at the unilateral service of expression. An arresting exaggeration? A sec
­ond-hand possession, that is not given, not by the mother, not with the moth
­er tongue, a secondariness that, therefore, no munificent giver could ever give.
 Therefore not even a law, benign — that is, inviting — or otherwise castrating.
 The writer so filled with the gripping theme, with the aim of such “unilaterary
 directness of expression” (167), arrives at the scene.
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Concealing shame sabotages intimacy.
—Adam Phillips, Terrors and Experts
In the classic philosophy of Plato the ascent toward wisdom begins in love.
 
Philosophical and linguistic power, figured by the upward movement of the
 soul, coincide with erotic attraction. As
 
Julia Kristeva discusses it, the episode  
of the charioteer in Phaedrus illustrates the interdependence of soul and eros
 and, by extension, the dependence of the philosopher on “the surge of empath
­ic desire” (66) that unfolds in a violent “sadomasochistic psychodrama” (64):
Now when the charioteer beholds the vision of love, and has his whole soul
 
warmed through sense, and is full of pricklings and ticklings of desire, the
 obedient steed, then as always under the government of shame, refrains
 from leaping on the beloved; but
 
the other, heedless of the pricks and of the  
blows of the whip, plunges and runs away, giving all manner of trouble to
 his companion and the charioteer, whom he forces to approach the beloved
 and to remember the joys of love. They at first indignantly oppose him and
 will not be urged on to do terrible and unlawful deeds; but at last, when he
 persists in plaguing them, they yield and agree to do as he bids them.
(Plato, Phaedras, quoted in Kristeva 65)
The bildung of the philosopher relies on the struggle with possession-love to
 
the extent that, 
as
 Kristeva comments, “phallic domination is elevated and  
metamorphosed into apprenticeship of the Good and the True” (67). Quite a
 different version of love can be found in Platos Symposium. There, Diotima
 bears the tale of an ideal love that constructs in view of the supreme good and
 of immortality. The knot of desire and intellectual empowerment seems less
 significant than the choice of the Good, a choice that unites the lover and the
 philosopher. In Diotima’s tale the philosopher/lover is the one who can stand
 midway between ignorance and wisdom, the position of
 
tempered desire. As  
far as the reader can tell, in the case of a woman
 
— Diotima’s — occupying this  
position of wisdom does not make her an entitled philosopher: though erudite,
 Diotima 
is
 not present at the banquet of the dialecticians. In Plato’s text she is 
a removed presence, and her theorizing is reported secondhand by Socrates.
* * *
Now imagine the woman again, and a room. Imagine the night in which the
 
lover has come within the reach of the object of
 
Beauty that had been before  
forever out of sight, lost, merely a shadow crumbling to the touch in the cave
 of imagos. Imagine the path ahead of which the object of Beauty now leads the
 lover; the lover’s hand extended and the path. From a point on, the beloved fol
­lows, his hand too reaching to heal, taking
 
the language of tenderness out of the  
room and in the roads and over the bridge almost imperceptibly for the lover
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— his hand falling lightly over the hip of the lover, healing, already a healer’s
 
hand in place of the beloved’
s,
 then already again quickly out of sight as it was  
before, ahead of the path. Imagine the path leading up to the room and the
 lover once more having covered the distance up to the point of beholding the
 object of Beauty.
Imagine the room, the lover and the beloved locked into the embrace in
 
which the lover can no longer let go of the beloved. If in the classic philoso
­phy of Plato the dialectician and the philosopher begin in love, if knowledge
 plants itself primarily in 
a
 tie of love, for  the woman in the room, who has come  
within the reach of Beauty, knowledge remains a drama of
 
perpetual suspen ­
sion. Positioned between the winged pair, with the prickling of desire that
 demands the narrativization of erotic aggression and domination, and Diotima’s
 ideal concept of love, how will the woman choose the path of wisdom? What
 will make of her the philosopher, the dialectician — which she knows she will
 be — with any sense of conviction? The beloved’s embrace locks her between
 an empowering subjection and an unreachable object of Beauty, two as yet
 uninitiated, unresolved paths. When will philosophy
 
begin?
Imagine the room, the brightness of the lights, the knotted bodies sus
­pended between the act-predicated narrative of the sadomasochistic drama of
 the charioteer and Diotima’s path which if taken, the woman now thinks, is
 bound for elliptical narrative, for the loss of the Concept. What will the
 woman do?
For the woman locked in the embrace, bidden by the presence of the
 
beloved, her soul born through the pricklings of sense, divided between the
 horror at the beloved’s flight and her own undecidability, wisdom (metaphysics)
 lies in the trauma of an in-between. The solution of the kiss, while reestab
­lishing an accord, a mutuality without violence, comes 
as
 the pass into a sec ­
ondary form of metaphysics. The kiss returns her to the poverty of an originary
 suspension, a figure of reciprocity and yet of secondary thought. Does the
 metaphysical
 
power  passed with a  kiss that stops before possession-love amount  
to boring theories? Does it risk itself as a subplot of the universal? A local,
 sexed thought, forever an image, a representation, a death-in-life?
Styles of kissing can be seen but not easily described, as though kissing
 
resists verbal representation. It is striking that, unlike other forms of sexu
­ality, there 
is
 little synonymy of kissing. It has generated no familiar slang,  
acquired virtually no language in which it can be redescribed. . . . Appar
­ently for the sake of interest stories often ignore, in a way films do not, the
 fact that the kiss itself is a story in miniature, a subplot.
(Phillips, On Kissing 95-6)
Imagine the room. The two locked in the embrace, kissing. The woman
 
thought of the beloved’s hair as he led, ahead on the path, before approaching.
 She thought he got the book, read it, and went swimming because he had
 become the charioteer feeling. She saw him swimming in the gorge, and his
 slender body, as he kissed her in the room. The beloved lifts the lover and car
­ries the lover until the end of the bright light, near the lit candle. Both are now
 suspended in a kissing that neither eradicates her from language nor sends
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through her the birth of conceptuality. Until before the beloved’s boredom.
 
Even as the beloved is telling what he loves, almost
 
beginning the narrative, the  
kiss reunites the two and returns them to human mutuality, freezing their
 shapes into the paradigm for the good social tie — a brotherly tie. It was as if
 the man let the woman kiss him: only the network of metaphors of healing
 could describe the kiss. This terminable, almost session-long kissing, out of
 need.
Arrived at on the way to a dialogue with his patient, Hungarian psychoan
­
alyst Sandor Ferenczi’s healing tenderness would seem the logical outcome of a
 psychoanalysis understood as a philosophy in practice, almost as a “vitafilosofi-
 ca.” Ferenczi’s tenderness revisits the classic scenario of the knot of knowledge
 and love, the dialogue of Socrates and Phaedrus by the plane tree and the
 spring. In the passage from philosophy to psychoanalysis, however, the philo
­sophical dialogue is no longer complicitous with possession-love. The “mater
­nal friendliness” (Stanton 135) of Ferenczi’s kiss displaces the power of the
 Concept with the quest for a healing social tie. While in the charioteer story
 conceptual power was indivisible from the eroticized traumatic transit of the
 initiated, Ferenczi’s tenderness — with a touch of utopian impatience, perhaps
 — rephrases for all of us the Concept as the question of an ethical beyond, of 
a better, more vigilant intersubjective tie: “Ferenczi wanted the psychoanalytic
 relationship to be the paradigm for social relations” (Phillips, Terrors 28). Tak
­ing its cue from the modern urban spectacle — so well portrayed by Marx and
 Engels — of strangers brutally, arbitrarily, thrown into a sudden intimacy, Fer
­enczi’s psychoanalysis concerns itself with “the greatest need.”7 But in trying to
 heal from this historical trauma, it also necessarily awakens the originary par




The third position is a familiar theme in Duras’s writing. The story of  
Anne-Marie Stretter and her lover appears again in The Vice-consul, and one of
 Duras’s last works, Yann Andrea Steiner, returns to this theme through the con
­siderable age difference separating the woman protagonist (Duras) and her
 young lover. In the love-making scene the old woman must put herself in the
 position of a child to bridge in her mind the scandalous gap between herself
 and her lover, half her age.
2.
 
This is the question Jacqueline Rose asks in her page for the SCT Sym ­
posium, in Postcards from the Edge.
3.
 
In her essay on Henry James’s “The Turn of the Screw,” Shoshana Fel-  
man asks: “Is it at all
 
possible to read and to interpret ambiguity without reduc ­
ing it in the very process of interpretation? Are reading and ambiguity in any
 way compatible?” (Writing and Madness 165).
4.
 
Title of a 1967 essay by Vargas Llosa and included in Making Waves.
5.
 
For the exigencies of this fiction, the relationship between Heidegger  
and her pupil has been simplified. For a more articulate discussion on the light
 that this relationship might shed on the question of love and the transmission
 of ideas, see my more academic, unpublished version of “Theoretical Effects.”
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“If we keep our cool, educational attitude, even vis-à-vis an opisthotonic  
patient [that is, one whose body is tensed up with anxiety], we tear to shreds
 the last thread that connects him to us. The patient gone off into his trance 
is a child indeed who no longer reacts to intellectual explanations, only perhaps to
 maternal friendliness; without it, he feels lonely and abandoned in his greatest
 need” (Ferenczi quoted in Stanton 135).
Works Cited
Auerbach, Erich. Mimesis. 1953. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1968.
Borch-Jacobsen, Mikkel. The Emotional Tie: Psychoanalysis Mimesis, and Affect.
Stanford: Stanford UP, 1992.
Derrida, Jacques. “Che cos’è la poesia?” The Derrida Reader. Ed. Peggy
 
Kamuf. New York: Columbia UP, 1991. 221-37.
Duras, Marguerite. The Ravishing of Lol Stein. New York: Grove P, 1966.
Felman, Shoshana. Writing and Madness: Literature/Philosophy/Psychoanalysis.
Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1985.
Freud, Sigmund. Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego. 1921. SE 18:
 
69-143.
Gramsci, Antonio. Le Opere. Roma: Editori Riuniti, 1997.
Jones, Ernest. Sigmund Freud: Life and Work. London: Hogarth, 1953.
Kristeva, Julia. Tales of Love. Trans. Leon 
S.
 Roudiez. New York: Columbia  
UP, 1987.
Lacoue-Labarthe, Philippe, and Jean-Luc Nancy. “The Unconscious Is
 
Destructured like an Affect.” Stanford Literature Review 6.2 (1989):
 191-209.
Llosa, Mario Vargas. Making Waves. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux,
 
1997.
Nancy, Jean-Luc. The Birth to Presence. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1993.
Nancy, Jean-Luc, and Ann Smock. 
“
Speaking Without Being Able To.”  
Jean-Luc Nancy. The Birth to Presence. 310-18.
Phillips, Adam. On Kissing, Tickling, and Being Bored: Psychoanalytic Essays on
 
the Unexamined Life. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1993.
— . Terrors and Experts. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1996.
Rich, Adrienne. “Twenty-one Love Poems.” Adrienne Rich's Poetry and Prose.
Ed. Albert Gelpi and Barbara Charlesworth Gelpi. New York: Norton,
 
1993.
Rose, Gillian. Mourning Becomes the Law. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996.
 
Rose, Jacqueline. “SCT Symposium — Cornell, Summer 1997.” Postcardsfrom
the Edge. School of Criticism and Theory, Cornell University. Summer
 
1997.
Searles, Harold F. “The Effort to Drive the Other Person Crazy — An Ele
­
ment in the Aetiology and Psychotherapy of Schizophrenia.” Collected
 Papers on Schizophrenia and Related 
Subjects.
 New York: International Uni ­
versities P, 1965. 254-83.
20
Journal X, Vol. 5 [2020], No. 1, Art. 2
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jx/vol5/iss1/2
Mena Mitrano 21
Stanton, Martin. Sandor Ferenczi: Reconsidering Active Intervention. North
­
vale, NJ: Jason Aronson, 1991.
Theweleit, Klaus. Object-Choice. Trans. Malcom Green. London: Verso,
 
1994.
Woolf, Virginia. The Waves. 1931. London: Penguin, 1975.
21
Mitrano: Theoretical Effects
Published by eGrove, 2020
